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Despite decreasing income inequality levels in the past decade, Brazil still ranks as one of the
most unequal countries in the world. According to UN data, its ratio of the average income of
the richest 10 percent to the poorest 10 percent was 40.6 in 2012, the 10th highest level in the
world by this measure. At the same time, the country has gone through a profound urbanization
process. Starting in the 1950s and for three decades, millions of lower-income people migrated
from rural to urban areas. At that time, migration was directed disproportionally to already large
metropolises, where location happened -mostly informally- in peripheral urban areas (Villaça,
1998, Telles, 1995). The following decades have been characterized by a shift towards high
population growth in small and medium size cities, and stagnant population growth rates in
large metropolises.
As a result, Brazil today has a highly complex urban system, with monocentric and polycentric
metropolitan areas ranging from global megacities to upcoming regional urban centers (IPEA,
IBGE, and UNICAMP, 2002). A fast-paced urbanization process under high income inequality has
led to high asymmetries in the access to transportation, basic public services and urban amenities
across income groups, related to different urban shapes. Given the diverse urban footprints that
have resulted from an accelerated process of urbanization in Brazil, it may be worth going beyond
considering an aggregate measure that carries no information about the actual use of urban space
such as average population density to more informative measures of the disposition of population
of different income levels and employment in space.
In this paper, we investigate the relationship between the urban spatial structure of Brazilian
cities and their income segregation. Income segregation can be defined as the uneven sorting of
households according to their income level within the urban space (Reardon and Bischoff, 2011).
Urban spatial structure is the degree of spatial concentration of jobs and their intrametropolitan
spatial distribution (Horton and Reynolds, 1971, Anas, Arnott, and Small, 1998). Specifically,
we address two questions: Do local job density conditions affect income segregation? Does
monocentricity-polycentricity foster income segregation? For these two questions, we also ana-
lyze how these relationships change with city size and income level.
Regarding our methodological approach, we first construct measures of income segregation
for the years 2000 and 2010 for 121 urban agglomerations (UAs) in Brazil. Specifically, we
use enumeration area level information to calculate rank-order measures of income segregation
(Reardon and Bischoff, 2011, Monkkonen and Zhang, 2014). These measures are independent
of shifts in the income distribution levels, and can be used to obtain consistent and comparable
measures at different points of the income distribution. In this way, we also obtain measures of
the segregation of the rich (90th percentile of the income distribution) and the segregation of the
poor (10th percentile) (Reardon and Bischoff, 2011, Chetty, Hendren, Kline, and Saez, 2014).
On the other hand, we use detailed information on the intrametropolitan distribution of
employment to identify and characterize the urban spatial structure of the urban agglomerations.
First, our main explanatory variable is the city average job density in a 1-km radius surrounding
each enumeration area. This 1-km density summarizes both the spatial concentration and the in-
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trametropolitan distribution of jobs (Duranton and Turner, 2016). Second, we rely on the method
developed by McMillen (2001) to identify the number of employment subcenters. According to
this number, urban agglomerations are classified as monocentric (one center, the Central Business
District or CBD) or polycentric (two or more centers, the CBD and subcenter/s). Third, we
compute the degree of monocentricity-polycentricity with the urban centrality index proposed
by Pereira, Nadalin, Monasterio, and Albuquerque (2013). Finally, we also characterize urban
agglomerations computing the average distance from the CBD and the job population ratio.
Using data for 2000 and 2010 and Instrumental Variables (IV) techniques, we regress the
log of our rank-order measure of income segregation on the log of urban spatial structure
variables, while controlling for informality, inequality, geography, demography and industrial
composition. Our results show that, first, local density conditions increase income segregation:
the effect is higher in monocentric cities and smaller in polycentric ones. Second, the degree of
monocentricity-polycentricity also affects segregation: while a higher concentration of jobs in and
around the CBD decreases segregation in monocentric cities, a higher employment concentration
in and around subcenters located far from the CBD decreases segregation in polycentric cities.
Third, results are heterogeneous according to city size: local density does not increase segregation
in small (monocentric) cities, it increases segregation in medium size cities, and it decreases
segregation in large (polycentric) cities. Finally, results also differ between income groups: while
local density conditions increase the segregation of the poor, a more polycentric configuration
reduces the segregation of the rich.
To the best of our knowledge, there are no works analyzing the relationship between urban
spatial structure and income segregation. The questions of whether and how urban spatial
structure affects income segregation contribute to debates weighting the equity effects of urban
policies such as zoning laws and urban plans affecting the distribution of employment within
cities (OECD, 2018). Our results could shed light, for instance, on the expected effect of compact
city interventions on income segregation in cities of different sizes and shapes. Previous related
research has studied the relationship between income segregation and population density (Pen-
dall and Carruthers, 2003, Wheeler, 2008). Population density is a city-level measure that does
not take into account the intrametropolitan distribution of households of different income levels
and firms. Furthermore, income segregation is measured with a dissimilarity index, which suffers
from a number of limitations including scale sensitivity issues (Reardon and O’Sullivan, 2004). On
the other hand, a number of works have analyzed the consequences of segregation on outcomes
such as poverty and upward mobility (Ananat, 2011, Chetty et al., 2014), but have not considered
the spatial structure of cities. Moreover, much of the focus of the income segregation literature
has been on metropolises (Villaça, 1998, Monkkonen and Zhang, 2014, Feitosa, Le, Vlek, Monteiro,
and Rosemback, 2012), but not much is understood about the determinants of segregation across
entire urban systems. We aim to provide a complete account of income segregation levels and
changes (also by income groups), an account of the different urban spatial structures present in
the Brazilian urban system, and econometric evidence on the relationship between the two.
After this introduction, Section 2 summarizes some predictions regarding the relationship
between income segregation and urban spatial structure. Section 3 details data sources and the
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measurement of income segregation. Section 4 presents the data and the different measures of
urban spatial structure. Section 5 develops our econometric approach. Section 6 discusses the
results, and Section 7 concludes.
2. Theoretical predictions
Models with residential mobility and firm immobility
In the the classical monocentric land use model by Alonso (1964), Mills (1967) and Muth (1969)
(hereafter AMM), all firms have a fixed location and concentrate at a unique CBD where workers
commute to work. As there are commuting costs per unit of distance, there is high demand for
land near the CBD, making living space at those locations smaller and more expensive. In the
spatial equilibrium, longer commutes are perfectly compensated by a lower price of living space.
In a setting with two income groups, the rich and the poor, the rich locate far away from the
CBD if their willingness to pay for housing when moving away from the CBD decreases more
slowly than that of the poor. In models introducing two commuting modes with different speeds
(e.g. the car and public transport), the rich commute longer distances faster by car, while the
poor remain in central areas and commute using public transport, as long as the elasticity of
housing demand with respect to income is greater than the elasticity of commuting costs per unit
of distance with respect to income (LeRoy and Sonstelie, 1983, Glaeser, Kahn, and Rappaport,
2008).1 This condition can be overturned by high congestion and its consequent high time costs,
which can lead to a ’return to the city’ process, where the rich move from the suburbs back to
central areas, trading off living space for proximity to jobs.
The basic AMM model rests on the assumption that all intra-urban locations are homogeneous
in terms of amenities, including the provision of public services. Including a spatial restriction
on the provision of public services can lead to the prediction that the rich locate in well-provided
areas, whereas the poor locate in under-provided areas (Griffin and Ford, 1980, Cheshire, Mona-
stiriotis, and Sheppard, 2003). This pattern is reinforced by any other additional attribute of
well-provided places, such as cultural amenities (Brueckner, Thisse, and Zenou, 1999). In cities
with a high share of young people, preferences also play a role, for instance if young, rich small
households trade off housing space for local amenities (Glaeser, 2008).
Lack of infrastructure provision across the whole city can also limit the supply of formal
housing to a few specific areas in the city (Posada-Duque, 2015). Limited provision to central
areas can lead the rich to segregate in more dense, vertical neighborhoods located near the CBD,
while the poor would scatter in low-rise informal constructions around the periphery (Henderson,
Regan, and Venables, 2016, Feler and Henderson, 2011). The residential mobility of the rich is
spatially constrained to within the best served area in the city, where rental prices would be
considerable higher because they integrate the valuation for proximity to public services and local
amenities (Cheshire et al., 2003). The rich can also influence zoning laws and the concentration
1Alternatively, the model by Brueckner, Thisse, and Zenou (2002), with worker and income heterogeneity but no
agglomeration of firms, predicts that low-skill, low-income workers bear the longest commutes and reside in the
periphery. This is because the low net wage earned by low-skilled workers (product of the training costs that their
skill mismatch implies) imply a low valuation of time and a consequent higher tolerance for longer commutes.
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of provision of public infrastructure and services, especially in contexts of high segregation
(Cutler, Glaeser, and Vigdor, 1999, Tiebout, 1956), further reinforcing the segregation of those
at the top of the income distribution. The eventual extension of the public infrastructure network
to non-central areas can also be accompanied by the emergence of rich neighborhoods in the
suburbs where the demand for single-family larger homes is met. Note that as long as these new
neighborhoods remain homogeneous in terms of their income composition - that is, if there an
exclusionary mechanism in place, such a substantial premium for exclusive local amenities -, the
level of segregation of the rich would remain high.
Furthermore, in models that consider the durability of housing stock (Brueckner and Rosen-
thal, 2009), the prediction that the older hosing stock located near the CBD previously used
by the rich filters down to the poor may have restricted validity for the bottom income groups
who have tight residential mobility restrictions related to the difficulty of accessing credit for
informal workers, the insecurity of tenure and poor definition of property rights that increase
permanence in informal plots. More generally, housing demand for those at the bottom of the
income distribution is also constrained by increasing housing demand, economic stagnation,
deterioration of real income and persistent income inequality, and stricter regulations to build
(Cavalcanti and Da Mata, 2013).
Models with residential mobility and firm mobility
So far we have not taken into account the location decisions of firms. The agglomeration of
(formal) employment may be yet another element contributing to the spatial concentration of
the rich in central areas. Without changing the assumption of firm immobility, Muth (1969)
shows that allowing for multiple employment centers does not alter the main predictions of
the monocentric model: the behaviour around each subcenter is the same as around the CBD.
However, the number of subcenters and their location is exogenously given.
The seminal model of Fujita and Ogawa (1982) considers both residential and job location
decisions of households, and the location decisions of firms. Firms agglomerate to take advan-
tage of a locational potential (associated with positive agglomeration externalities that occur at
short distances, such as knowledge spillovers). Under certain parameter values (including low
commuting cost), a similar structure as in the AMM model arises, with all firms agglomerating
in one location. However, other parameter specifications such as higher commuting costs lead to
the emergence of employment subcenters and the consequent mixed used of land.
This model, and more sophisticated versions of it (Lucas and Rossi-Hansberg, 2002), although
highly complex, do not explicitly consider the location decisions of households of different income
levels. They also rest on the assumption of homogeneous provision across the city. Under
asymmetric provision, besides agglomeration economies, the same factors pulling together rich
households, such as the higher availability of amenities and better transport connectivity, could
be pulling together (formal) firms and slowing down a process of employment decentralization.
Once it occurs, the decentralization of employment could have an impact on residential segre-
gation by levels of income depending on how distant the new employment subcenters are from
the CBD and the area where the rich reside. For instance, if the provision of public infrastructure
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and amenities is incremental from the historical CBD (towards an expanded CBD), and both
rich households and firms de-concentrate in the proximities of the historical CBD as a result,
the decentralization of employment would not be necessarily associated with lower residential
segregation. However, new subcenters could also arise in peripheral locations from the need
to benefit from lower rents and inter-city transport connections. These centers could release
some of the pressure to locate in central areas for higher-income households, and favor a more
even dispersion of households of different income levels across the city. Still, the segregation
of the poor may not decrease if there is a large percentage of informal workers and informal
employment centers are located far away from formal employment centers, for instance in lower
income neighborhoods. In this case, informal workers may trade-off higher incomes in the formal
sector for lower rents and lower commuting costs as long as they can find informal jobs in their
local area (Moreno-Monroy and Posada, 2014).
3. Income segregation in Brazilian cities
3.1 Data
To calculate urban agglomeration-level measures of segregation2, we use income distribution
information at the setor censitario level from the 2000 and 2010 Population Census micro-data
freely distributed by IBGE. The setor censitario level is equivalent to enumeration areas defined for
surveying purposes. Each unit contains on average 400 households.
The individual unit of analysis is the head of household (i.e., a person responsible for the
household who is older than 10 years-old) categorized as belonging to one of nine ordered income
categories. This unit is chosen over households because, unlike the 2010 census, the 2000 census
does not include income distribution information for households. Income is defined as the level
of nominal monthly income from work or other sources measured in income bins relative to the
number of minimum wages.3 Table D.1 shows summary statistics of the frequency of income bins
across UAs.
3.2 Dimensions of segregation
As explained by Reardon and O’Sullivan (2004), there are two conceptually different dimensions
to spatial segregation: 1) spatial exposure (or spatial isolation), and 2) spatial evenness (or spatial
clustering). As suggested by its name, spatial exposure (spatial isolation) captures how likely
it is for a member of one group to encounter a member of another group (the same group) in
their local environments. On the other hand, spatial evenness (clustering) captures how evenly
(unevenly) distributed are groups in the urban space.
Figure 1, taken from Reardon and O’Sullivan (2004), helps illustrating the conceptual difference
between exposure (isolation) and evenness (clustering). Consider families in two income groups,
the rich (black dots) and the poor (white dots) and four different spatial arrangements of families
2Appendix A presents our definition of urban agglomerations, that is, our sample of Brazilian cities.
3The legal minimum wage was BRL 151,00 in 2000 and BRL 510,00 in 2010, approximately USD 206 and USD 287
respectively.
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in four different cities, each represented in a quadrant of Figure 1. In which city are rich families
more segregated? The answer will depend on the dimension of segregation we are considering.
The rich in the two cities in the upper two quadrants are equally not segregated in terms of
evenness/clustering, because they do not concentrate in any particular area within the city.
However, they are more isolated in the city on the upper left quadrant, simply because there
are less rich families in this city, making it less likely for a member of a rich family to encounter
a member of a poor family in her neighborhood. If we are considering the evenness/clustering
dimension, the answer will be that the rich are more segregated in the two cities at the bottom
quadrants.
Figure 1: Dimensions of income segregation
Note that while moving from a more dissimilar to a more similar percentage of people in dif-
ferent groups should result in higher spatial exposure, the level of spatial evenness can change in
either direction, because it depends on the spatial arrangements of the different groups in space.
Thus, unlike the exposure dimension, the evenness dimension of segregation is independent of
the initial population composition, a desirable property for inter-city comparisons. We focus on
the measurement of segregation measures that capture spatial evenness/clustering.
Lastly, we note that we are focusing in only one of many dimensions of segregation (Massey
and Denton, 1988). In this respect, our measure does not capture the degree of centralization,
or the spatial concentration of a certain income group in the central area of the city. Common
interpretations related to ”center-periphery” city structures (Ruiz-Rivera and van Lindert, 2016)
are based in these type of indicators, which require the definition of a unique CBD as point
of reference, and the definition of thresholds that divide income classes, which complicates
comparisons over time and across cities. Moreover, in our approach we acknowledge the existence
of polycentric city structures, which make it hard to interpret centralization measures based on a
unique CBD. Our measure is also not meant to capture the concentration of income groups, that
is, whether the proportion of land used by a certain income groups is disproportionally low or
high compared to its relative share in the population.
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3.3 Rank-order segregation index
Our choice of measure for income segregation, the rank-order information theory index, is based
on income percentile ranks. The measure uses the full distribution of income, is independent
of threshold choices and is insensitive to shape-preserving changes in the income distribution
(Reardon and Bischoff, 2011). The measure then captures the extent of residential segregation
by income levels, as opposed to capturing changes in income levels (resulting from changes in
income inequality) even when no residential sorting takes place as a consequence in the change in
income levels (Watson, 2009). As detailed in Reardon (2011), it satisfies a wide range of desirable
properties for segregation indexes.
We dismiss the use of a ”categorical approach”, under which income information is split
between two different income categories (Pendall and Carruthers, 2003), because it throws away
valuable information on the distribution of income, and because it is sensitive to the choice of
income threshold (Reardon and Bischoff, 2011, Watson, 2009).
The rank-order information theory index captures the ratio of within-unit income rank varia-
tion to overall income rank variation (Reardon and Bischoff, 2011). It is basically a weighted sum
of all possible pair-wise income segregation indices. More specifically, let p denote percentile
ranks in a given income distribution. The pair-wise information theory index H is defined as:





where tj is the population in the local environment j, T is the total population in the urban area,
and E is the entropy of the total population given by E(p) = plog2 1p + (1 − p)log2
1
(1−p) . The
rank-order information theory index is defined as:




The H index varies between 0 and 1, where 0 means there is no segregation (i.e., the income
distribution of each local environment is exactly equal to that of the city), and 1 means there
is maximum segregation (i.e., each local environment is composed of individuals of the same
income category). An alternative interpretation of H is how much less income rank variation
there is within neighborhoods than in the overall population. In the a-spatial version of the index
(denoted hereafter as HA), which we use here, the local environment is defined by the area
boundaries. The interpretation of HA is the same as that of H.4
We then construct an income profile for each urban agglomeration, that is, a curve describing
the relationship between HA and the percentage of individuals in each income category. See
Appendix C for methodological details. We use these profiles to define a measure of segregation
as experienced by two given income percentiles (Reardon and Bischoff, 2011): the 10th percentile,
representing the segregation of the poor, and the 90th percentile, representing the segregation of the
rich. These cut-off points have been used in previous studies analyzing the segregation of the
4It is possible to construct a spatial version of the H index that allows for more flexible definitions of neighbour-
hoods based on different bandwidths. Here we prefer the a-spatial version, noting that it provides upper-boundary
estimates for fine neighborhood definitions. See Appendix B for a detailed discussion.
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poor and the rich using a similar methodology (Bischoff and Reardon, 2014, Chetty et al., 2014).
We also show results for a different cut-off (20 percent and 80 percent) that may better represent
local poverty measures (i.e., those based on poverty lines).
Table 1 shows summary statistics for the rank-order HA index, as well as for our two different
proxies of segregation of the poor (10th and 20th percentiles) and the rich (80th and 90th
percentiles) for 2000 and 2010. On average, segregation of all income groups decreased from
0.139 to 0.133 between 2000 and 2010. In particular, average segregation increased in 38 cities and
decreased in 83, with Cachoeiro de Itapemirim, Atibaia, Quadra, Teresópolis, João Pessoa and
São Paulo showing the largest increases, and Cuiabá, Itaperuna, Umuarama, Vale do Aço, Jequié
and Juazeiro do Norte showing the largest reductions. Those at the top of the income distribution
(80th and 90th percentiles) are more segregated but, at the same time, experienced a reduction
in their segregation index from 0.200-0.240 to 0.198-0.236. On the other hand, despite being less
segregated, those at the bottom of the income distribution (10th and 20th percentiles) increased
their segregation from 0.079-0.080 to 0.093-0.081.
Table 1: Summary statistics for rank-order segregation HA index
All cities
Mean S.D. Min Max
2000 HA 0.139 0.039 0.073 0.275
2010 HA 0.133 0.041 0.052 0.274
2000 HA 10th percentile 0.079 0.028 0.039 0.224
2010 HA 10th percentile 0.093 0.028 0.041 0.227
2000 HA 20th percentile 0.080 0.029 0.036 0.212
2010 HA 20th percentile 0.081 0.031 0.016 0.175
2000 HA 80th percentile 0.209 0.060 0.112 0.410
2010 HA 80th percentile 0.198 0.060 0.095 0.408
2000 HA 90th percentile 0.240 0.064 0.124 0.430
2010 HA 90th percentile 0.236 0.064 0.110 0.417
Notes: 121 observations (cities) in ’All cities’ sample.
Compared to the US, the average value of HA for 2010 is smaller than the value of 0.148
reported in Bischoff and Reardon (2014) for 117 metropolitan areas using the same methodology,
even though the inequality level in Brazil is much higher. This can be partly explained by the fact
that the poorer (10th percentile) experience higher levels of segregation in U.S. metropolitan areas
with values of 0.146 and 0.163 in 2000 and 2010, respectively. On the other hand, segregation of
the rich (percentile 90th) is lower in US cities with values of 0.185 and 0.200 in 2000 and 2010.5
5It is important to note that our estimates of the segregation of the poor possibly underestimate the true level of
segregation at the bottom of the income distribution because we do not take into account heads of household with
zero reported income. The reason to exclude them is that the number of such individuals is much larger in 2010 than






































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Table 2 shows the value of the HA indices for the 35 largest cities. When considering all
incomes groups, Brasília is the most segregated city (a result already found by Telles (1995) in the
1980s), and Blumenau the least segregated. There is no clear trend in the changes in segregation
in these larger cities between 2000 and 2010, as some cities decreased their segregation levels (e.g.,
Salvador and Brasília), whereas others increased them (e.g., Rio de Janeiro and São Paulo). For
income groups, the much higher segregation of the rich is particularly salient in the largest cities,
while there is no clear pattern in the relationship between city size and the segregation of the
poor.
4. Urban spatial structure in Brazilian cities
4.1 Data
To calculate urban spatial structure measures, we use establishment-level data from the Annual
Social Information Report (Relação Anual de Informações Sociais - RAIS) for 2000 and 2009.
The RAIS is carried out by the Ministry of Labor of Brazil (Ministério do Trabalho e Emprego
(MTE)), and covers an administrative report filled by all tax registered establishments. The data
includes information on the number of employees and wage payroll, among others. The identified
version of the database allocates a unique code to each firm, and provides the specific address of
each establishment. In order to obtain employment totals at the enumeration area level, we use
information on postal addresses and their corresponding 2010 enumeration area code for each
municipality from the National Registry of Addresses (CNEFE) provided by the IBGE. For more
details on the processing and geolocation of this data, see Appendix A.
Finally, it is important to notice that these datasets only consider formal jobs and, unfortu-
nately, there is no other source to account informal employment at the enumeration area level.
Since informality is an important feature of Brazilian cities and we can compute it at the city level
using population census data, we will control for the informality rate in our empirical strategy.
See Section 5 and Appendix A for further details.
4.2 Measuring urban spatial structure
Density
According to Anas et al. (1998), urban spatial structure refers to the degree of spatial concentration
of population and employment within a city, and ’density’ is usually used to measure such degree
in terms of residents and/or jobs per unit of land. Traditionally this measure has been computed
for the whole city, that is, by dividing the number of inhabitants and/or jobs by the area of
the city. However, urban spatial structure also refers to the spatial distribution of firms and
residences within the city (Horton and Reynolds, 1971), and the ’overall city density’ does not
take into account this feature.
Following Duranton and Turner (2016), we can consider both dimensions, the spatial concen-
tration and the intrametropolitan distribution of jobs and/or residents, by computing ’density’ at
a more local geographical level. In particular, for the case of employment we can compute ’the
10






UA Jobs in the surrounding 1-km radius
3.1416 sq km
)
where n is the number of enumeration areas in each Brazilian UA.
While the 1-km density is our main explanatory variable, in some robustness checks we use
this local measure using radii of 3, 5, 7 and 10 km.
Table 3 reports descriptive statistics for the 1-km density. For the sample of all 121 UAs,
the average employment density within a radial distance of 1 km increased from 591 to 857
employments per square kilometer (45%) between 2000 and 2010. It is important to notice the
important differences between the cities, as shown by the high standard deviations (448 and 591
jobs per sq km in 2000 and 2010, respectively).
Table 3: Summary statistics for urban spatial structure variables
All cities Monocentric cities Polycentric cities
Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max
2000 Number of subcenters 2.9 4.1 1 22
2010 Number of subcenters 3.2 5.2 1 33
2000 1-km density 591 448 115 2,769 455 233 115 1,493 940 643 266 2,769
2010 1-km density 857 591 187 4,041 624 302 235 1,662 1,199 734 187 4,041
2000 UCI 0.382 0.165 0.003 0.702 0.389 0.161 0.203 0.702 0.366 0.177 0.003 0.686
2010 UCI 0.382 0.159 0.003 0.713 0.384 0.146 0.060 0.713 0.377 0.178 0.003 0.706
2000 ADC 9.9 13.2 0.9 76.0 8.0 10.6 0.9 76.0 14.5 17.5 2.0 72.1
2010 ADC 10.1 14.1 0.9 91.6 9.3 14.8 0.9 91.6 11.2 13.0 1.9 73.5
2000 JR 0.19 0.18 0.05 2.030 0.19 0.21 0.05 2.030 0.19 0.05 0.12 0.31
2010 JR 0.22 0.06 0.06 0.37 0.20 0.06 0.06 0.33 0.24 0.06 0.09 0.37
Notes: 121 observations (cities) in ’All cities’ sample. 87 and 72 monocentric cities, and 34 and 49 polycentric cities
in 2000 and 2010, respectively.
Table 4 reports individual descriptive statistics for the largest 35 UAs in Brazil. For the case
of the 1-km density, there are important differences between cities: while São Paulo is the most
dense (2,769 and 4,041 jobs per sq km in 2000 and 2010, respectively), Cuiabá is the less dense
(339 and 521 jobs per sq km in 2000 and 2010, respectively).
Monocentricity vs. polycentricity
Taking into account the location patterns of jobs within cities, they can be classified as ’monocen-
tric’, when there is only one employment center or CBD, or as ’polycentric’, when there are two
or more employment centers (one CBD and one or more subcenters).
For the case of Brazil in 2000 and 2010, we identify the enumeration areas that make up the
CBD and the subcenters. Since there is no official definition of CBDs in Brazilian cities, we identify
the CBD in each of the UAs as the enumeration area (or group of enumeration areas) with the



































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































Similarly, there is no official definition of employment subcenters. An employment subcenter is
a place with a significantly larger employment density than nearby locations that has a significant
effect on the overall spatial distribution of jobs. We identify subcenters using the method first
developed by McDonald and Prather (1994) and improved by McMillen (2001). The main idea is
to estimate densities following a monocentric spatial pattern. The predicted densities obtained
are subtracted from the corresponding real densities. From these residuals, those that are positive
and statistically significant are selected.
While McDonald and Prather (1994) estimate by OLS a two dimensional density function (log
of density on the distance to CBD), McMillen (2001) suggests estimating a three-dimensional
density function (log of density on north-south and east-west distances to CBD) with a Locally
Weighted Regression (LWR). Both improvements allow taking into account geographical differ-
ences, which, in terms of the spatial pattern of densities, can occur in any direction from the
CBD (e.g. steeper density gradients on the north side than on the south side of the city). They
additionally allow us to define any type of monocentric spatial pattern: concave, convex or linear.
We therefore estimate the following population/employment density function:
ln(Density) = γ0 + γ1 × North-south distance to CBD + γ2 × East-west distance to CBD (3)
where density is measured as jobs per square kilometer, and distances are in kilometers. Since our
estimates will be based on LWR, we need to define a bandwidth. As McMillen (2001) points out,
this is a critical choice because we need a monocentric benchmark. We experiment with alternative
window sizes ranging from 1% to 9% and from 10% to 90%. Based on visual inspection, a 50%
window size shows the first monocentric spatial configuration.
Second, for each site, we compute the residual as the difference between the log of real density
and the estimated log of density. We then select those that are significantly positive at a 10% level,
according to their own standard errors that can vary over space (McMillen, 2001). Finally, we will
group the selected sites in subcenters when they are contiguous. We use a ’queen’ criterion for
contiguity: two sites are contiguous if they share at least one point in their boundaries.
We detect the existence of subcenters in 34 and 49 UAs (Table 3). On average, the number of
subcenters increased from 2.9 to 3.2 and São Paulo is the city with more subcenters (22 and 33 in
2000 and 2010, respectively) (Table 4).
According to their urban spatial structure, Table 3 shows that polycentric cities are more dense
(940 and 1,199 jobs per sq km in 2000 and 2010, respectively) than their monocentric counterparts
(455 and 624 jobs per sq km in 2000 and 2010, respectively). Furthermore, standard deviations
show important differences within both urban forms.
Table 4 show that (1) most populated cities are mainly polycentric (only Ribeirão Preto and
Sorocaba are monocentric in 2000 and 2010, and Cuiabá becomes monocentric in 2010), (2) most
polycentric cities increase the number of subcenters (only 8 UAs have the same subcenters in 2000
and 2010), and (3) the higher the 1-km density, the higher the number of subcenters.
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Other measures
In order to fully characterize the urban spatial structure we also compute other measures.
First, Pereira et al. (2013) propose the ’urban centrality index (UCI)’ to measure the degree of
monocentricity-polycentricity:
UCI = LC × PI = LC × (1 − SSI
SSImax
)
Where LC is the traditional ’location coefficient’ that measures the unequal distribution of jobs
within each UA, that is, how disproportionately jobs are clustered in a few locations or dispersed










where n is the number of enumeration areas in each UA. The range of the LC is zero to 1 - 1/n.
If LC equals zero, then economic activity is evenly distributed, while values close to (1 - 1/n)
indicate that employment is concentrated in a few areas. In its conventional form, this coefficient
captures only the nonspatial inequality of job distribution.
PI is a ’proximity index’ built on the ’spatial separation index (SSI)’ proposed by Midelfart-
Knarvik, Overman, Redding, and Venables (2002) to overcome its problems: We also consider the












The minimum value of SSI is zero and indicates that all jobs are concentrated in just one
enumeration area. By normalizing with the maximum attainable value of the SSI (SSImax), the PI
can be compared across UAs. The range of PI is zero to one. If PI is zero, all jobs are spatially
separated as possible and the distance between them is at its maximum.
The UCI combines the advantages of the LC and the PI: it controls for differences in size and
shapes and, as result, allow for comparison across UAs. UCI values range between 0 and 1:
values close to zero are related to a more polycentric spatial configuration, and values close to
one to a more monocentric urban spatial structure.
Table 3 shows average UCI values of 0.381 in both years and, as a result, the 121 cities are more
close to a polycentricity than to monocentricty. When considering the monocentric sample, the
UCI value reduces indicating that these monocentric cities became more disperse between 2000
and 2010. On the other hand, polycentric cities increase their UCI value and, as a result, these
cities are becoming more concentrated around their employment subcenters and around their
CBD (with (new) subcenters near the CBD).
Table 4 also shows big differences between the largest cities: while the most polycentric city is
São José dos Campos (its jobs are highly concentrated around its unique subcenter and its CBD),
the least polycentric UA is Manaus (with 1 and 3 subcenters in 2000 and 2010, respectively).
Among the monocentric cities, jobs are more concentrated (around the CBD) in Ribeirão Preto
than in Sorocaba.
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We also use the weighted average distance from the CBD (ADC) to measure the degree of







× Distance to CBDi)
Table 3 shows that all 121 cities are highly centralized: on average, jobs are located 9.9 and
10.1 km from the CBD in 2000 and 2010, respectively. According to their urban form, monocentric
cities are more centralized and, at the same time, they decentralized between 2000 and 2010 (from
8 to 9.3 km from the CBD). On the contrary, polycentric UAs are more decentralized but became
more centralized between 2000 and 2010 (from 14.5 to 11.2 km). These trends are in line with UCI
trends: monocentric cities are becoming more disperse/decentralized, and polycentric cities are
becoming more concentrated/centralized with (new) subcenters located closer to the CBD. Once
again, it is important to notice the important differences between cities within the monocentric
and polycentric samples as shown by the high standard deviations in ADC values.
Table 4 also highlights these big differences between the largest cities: while Aracaju (polycen-
tric with one subcenter) is the most centralized city, Cuiabá (which became monocentric in 2010)
is the most decentralized.





On average, the number of jobs per inhabitant increased from 0.19 to 0.22 between 2000 and
2010. According to their urban configuration, the increase was smaller in monocentric cities (from
0.19 to 0.20) than in polycentric cities (from 0.19 to 0.24) (Table 3). Among the largest cities (Table
4), the JR is smaller in Baixada Santista (0.15 and 0.19 in 2000 and 2010, respectively) and higher
in Blumenau (0.34 and 0.37 in 2000 and 2010, respectively).
5. Econometric approach
5.1 Expectations on empirical estimates
Previous studies have attempted to establish a relationship between observed city-level values
of income segregation and city characteristics, such as city size, population density and income
inequality (Pendall and Carruthers, 2003, Wheeler, 2008). Based on the theoretical predictions
outlined in Section 2, our aim is to establish whether urban spatial structure has an independent
role in determining income segregation levels. According to the models discussed, the main
driving force behind this relationship is the competition for proximity to existing economic
opportunities among individuals with varying income levels. Lower commuting costs, preference
for more housing space, higher service provision, more decentralized amenities, and a more
decentralized pattern of employment are opposing forces to the expected effect of urban spatial
structure on income segregation.
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Clearly, the scale of existing economic activity is a key factor mediating the relationship
between urban spatial structure and income segregation. Access to economic centers typically
decreases as population expands while economic activity remains concentrated and transport
provision remains constant. For this reason, it can be expected that for small cities in which
commuting costs to a unique center remain relatively low, there is a weaker impact of urban
spatial structure on income segregation levels. For medium-sized cities, the expectation is that
larger local density levels are related to larger levels of income segregation, as there is tighter
competition for access to economic opportunities between firms and households of different
income levels. The positive impact of local employment density on income segregation can reach
its maximum level in cities where the tight locational competition is exacerbated by policies
restricting the availability of housing at accessible locations, and/or a lack of provision of public
services, transport and amenities outside the main center. After a certain scale is reached,
congestion effects at the unique center start dominating, and the emergence of new economic
(sub)centers acts as a release on the clustering of households of similar incomes in particular
neighborhoods.
The way in which urban spatial structure impacts segregation levels at the top and bottom
of the income distribution is determined by a combination of varying degrees of residential
mobility and the availability of housing catering different income groups. The fact that higher
income levels are associated with a higher degree of residential mobility implies that many of
the dynamics underlying the impact of urban spatial structure on income segregation levels
are driven by residential mobility decisions of higher income households. In other words,
concentrations of high-income households in a few neighborhoods is likely to be the outcome
of locational bidding, while concentrations of lower income households may be the result of low
residential mobility. As cities get larger, the very same high degree of residential mobility at the
top of the income distribution can be behind a fall in income segregation levels, as higher income
households disperse across multiple locations in the city, while the low residential mobility
of lower-income households can have the opposite effect, as lower income households remain
clustered in few areas.
The extent to which these relationships hold can help understand what kind of city configu-
rations are more conducive to more inclusive cities, and serve as a framework to understand the
possible role of policies affecting accessibility and availability of housing across income groups
on income segregation. Given that predictions of the effect of urban spatial structure on income
segregation are expected to vary with the degree of monocentricity, city size and income group, in
the empirical application we present separately the results for these dimensions, after presenting
the result for the base average case.
5.2 Specification
After obtaining our measures of income segregation and urban spatial structure, we turn to
our research questions: holding other factors constant, which is the effect of the urban spatial
structure on income segregation?
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To answer this question, we use data for 2000 and 2010 to regress the log of HA on the log of
urban form variable/s:
ln(HAi,t) = δ0 + δ1 × ln(Urban spatial structurei,t)
+ ∑
j









(δ5,l × Industrial compositioni,l,t−10)
(4)
Since urban spatial structure variables are computed for formal jobs (because of data availabil-
ity), we first control for the share of informal jobs (%) in the UAs in 2000 and 2010 (Informality)
(see Appendix A for further details). Furthermore, we also control for differences in the degree
of income Inequality in the cities by including the log of Gini index6 and the log of per capita
income in 1990 and 2000.
We add controls for Geography such as the total area (km2) of the city, a dummy for UAs
located on the coast, and a dummy for cities located on semi-arid regions. Following Da Mata,
Deichmann, Henderson, Lall, and Wang (2007), we control for planning policies by adding the
share of population in municipalities within the UA with land zone law (%).
We also include controls for Demography such as the share of population above 55 years old
(%), the share of population below 25 years old (%), and the share of migrants (%) in 1990 and
2000.
Finally, we control for Industrial composition with the share of jobs in manufacturing (%) and
the share of jobs in services (%) in 1990 and 2000.
Summary statistics for the segregation index and the urban spatial structure variables were
previously discussed and are in Tables 1 and 3. Descriptive statistics for our controls variables
are in Appendix A Table D.2.
5.3 Endogeneity
We fear for some sources of endogeneity in the relationship running from urban spatial structure
to segregation, in particular for our main explanatory variable, the 1-km employment density.
To address these concerns, our empirical strategy rely on instrumental variables (IV) tech-
niques in which we instrument the 1-km job density with the overall city job density. Following
Ciccone and Hall (1996) and Wheeler (2008), our instrument uses 30 years lagged values: the UA
job density for 1970 and 1980.
This instrument is valid because of its significant first-stage coefficients (available upon re-
quest). This instrument is also exogenous because, as Da Mata et al. (2007) highlight, Brazil
and its cities have undergone significant changes in their economy and society since the 1970s
and the 1980s. Similar to Duranton and Turner (2012), Garcia-López (2012), Garcia-López, Holl,
6Alternatively, we use the log of Theil index and results hold.
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and Viladecans-Marsal (2015) and Garcia-López, Hemet, and Viladecans-Marsal (2017a,b), the
exogeneity of historical instruments hinges on having an appropriate set of controls, geography
and history variables in particular. In our case, we add controls for geography, but also inequality,
demography and industrial composition variables computed using historical values (1990 and
2000).
6. Results
6.1 Does employment density affect income segregation?
To study the impact of urban spatial structure on income segregation, we first investigate whether
higher local employment densities increase or reduce income segregation levels. To do so, we use
Eq. (4) to estimate the effect of 1-km job density on our HA index.
Table 5 presents OLS and TSLS estimates. Conditional on the full set of control variables, OLS
results are in column 1 and the estimated coefficient of interest show that a 10% increase in the
local density increases income segregation index by 2% (around a 0.02-0.03 points increase in the
index).
Table 5: The effect of urban spatial structure on income segregation: Employment density
Dependent variable: ln(HA index)
Years: 00-10 00-10 00-10 00-10 00-10 00-10 2000 2010
Method: OLS TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
ln(1-km employment density) 0.197a 0.321a 0.304a 0.339a 0.368a 0.446a 0.421a 0.485a
(0.037) (0.039) (0.075) (0.070) (0.074) (0.100) (0.087) (0.155)
Adjusted R2 0.720
First-stage F-statistic 84.95 49.89 59.91 58.79 46.48 35.09 16.65
Instrument ln(t-30 years employment density)
Informality & Inequality Y N Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geography Y N N Y Y Y Y Y
Demography Y N N N Y Y Y Y
Industrial composition Y N N N N Y Y Y
Observations 242 242 242 242 242 242 121 121
UA 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121
Notes: All regressions include state and year fixed-effects. Robust standard errors are in parenthesis (clustered by
UA in columns 1-5). a, b, and c indicates significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
In columns 2-8, we instrument local density with the overall UA density lagged t − 30 years.
Column 2 includes the 1-km density and state and year fixed-effects, column 3 adds controls
for income and inequality, column 4 adds geography, column 5 adds demography, and column
6 includes industrial composition controls. Columns 7 and 8 are cross-section estimates for
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years 2000 and 2010. With estimated coefficients7 that are quite stable across the different
specifications, TSLS results clearly show that local density conditions have a significant effect
on income segregation. In particular, results in our preferred specification in column 6 indicate
that a 10% increase in local job density increases income segregation index by 4.5% (around a 0.06
points increase in the index). First-stage statistics for the TSLS regressions are above the Stock
and Yogo (2005) critical values.
Now we consider alternative computations of job density and alternative measures of urban
spatial structure. The idea is to check the robustness of the above results and, in particular, to
test whether other aspects of the urban spatial structure also matter. Table 6 reports TSLS results
when we compute the local job density for different radii (columns 1-4) and when we combine
our preferred local density measure (1-km) with other urban spatial structure variables used in
the empirical literature (see Section 4): the weighted average distance from the CBD (columns 5
and 8), the job population ratio (columns 6 and 8), and the urban centrality index (columns 7 and
8). Table 6 also reports their first-stage statistics and all of them are above the Stock and Yogo
(2005) critical values.
Table 6: The effect of urban spatial structure on income segregation: Other measures
Dependent variable: ln(HA index)
Years: 00-10 00-10 00-10 00-10 00-10 00-10 00-10 00-10
Method: TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS
Radius: 3-km 5-km 7-km 10-km 1-km 1-km 1-km 1-km
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6] [7] [8]
ln(X-km employment density) 0.356a 0.296a 0.253a 0.214a 0.457a 0.361a 0.340a 0.351a
(0.072) (0.053) (0.043) (0.036) (0.095) (0.083) (0.074) (0.069)
ln(Weighted average distance from CBD) -0.014 -0.036
(0.024) (0.031)
ln(Job ratio) -0.145 -0.132
(0.092) (0.085)
ln(Urban centrality index) -0.039c -0.069b
(0.023) (0.029)
First-stage F-statistic 85.27 125.7 174.6 237.5 59.55 68.12 58.20 119.6
Instrument ln(t-30 years employment density)
Informality & Inequality Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geography Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Demography Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industrial composition Y Y Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 242 242 242 242 242 242 242 242
UA 121 121 121 121 121 121 121 121
Notes: All regressions include state and year fixed-effects. Robust standard errors clustered by UA are in parenthe-
sis. a, b, and c indicates significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
For the case of alternative local density variables, their estimated coefficients decrease with
7Alternatively, we also estimate a 2000–2010 changes on 2000 levels version of Eq. (4) to account for potential path
dependence issues and the results hold. Similarly, as explained in Section 3, our segregation index is computed using
information for the head of household because income of other household members is only available for 2010. Table
E.1 show results for 2010 cross-sections when HA is computed with income information of all household members.
Results are similar to those in column 8 Table 5.
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the radius of the density variable, but, in general, they are in line with our preferred estimate in
column 6 Table 5: higher local densities increase income segregation.
When combining the 1-km density with alternative urban form variables, the estimated co-
efficient for the 1-km density remains positive and similar to our preferred estimate in column
6 Table 5. Among the alternative urban spatial structure variables, only the urban centrality
index is significant (columns 7 and 8). Its negative estimated coefficient indicates that a higher
degree of monocentricity decreases income segregation. In the following analyses we study the
impact of urban spatial structure on income segregation using both significant variables: the 1-km
job density, to consider the effect of local density conditions, and the urban centrality index, to
consider the effect of the intrametropolitan distribution of jobs in a monocentric or polycentric
context.
As a whole, TSLS results in Tables 5 and 6 show that density increases income segregation. At
the same time, a more monocentric configuration, that is, an employment location pattern more
centralized around the CBD, reduces income segregation.
6.2 Does monocentricity-polycentricity foster income segregation?
Descriptive statistics in Section 4 show the existence of monocentric and polycentric cities, and,
in particular, the clear relationship between higher densities and a polycentric location pattern.
Since the type of urban spatial structure and the above mentioned relationship might affect the
estimated coefficients for the 1-km density and the urban centrality index, we now turn our
attention to study whether previous results hold when we separately consider both urban forms.
Table 7 reports TSLS results when we separately study monocentric (columns 1-2) and poly-
centric (columns 3-4) cities. For both types of cities and conditional on the full set of control
variables, columns 1 and 3 includes the 1-km job density, and columns 2 and 4 adds the urban
centrality index. Their first-stage statistics are above the Stock and Yogo (2005) critical values
(columns 2-4) or near the Stock and Yogo (2005)’s rule of thumb (F>10).
According to the type of employment location pattern, the local density still show a positive
and significant impact on income segregation. However, the effect is significantly smaller for
polycentric cities than for monocentric ones: a 10% increase in the 1-km job density increases
income segregation by 7% in monocentric cities and only by 3% in polycentric cities.
Similarly, the effect of the urban centrality index differs between urban forms: while it is no
significant for monocentric cities, it is positive and significant for polycentric cities. This latter
result implies that a higher degree of polycentricity (i.e., a lower value for the urban centrality
index) reduces income segregation. In other words, in polycentric cities like Sao Paulo the more
the employment is clustered around the subcenters and far from the CBD, the more income
segregation decreases.
Jointly, the 1-km job density and the urban centrality index results clearly show that urban
spatial structure plays an important role on city’s income segregation.
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Table 7: The effect of urban spatial structure on income segregation: Mono vs. Polycentricity
Dependent variable: ln(HA index)
Urban spatial structure: Monocentric Polycentric
Years: 00-10 00-10 00-10 00-10
Method: TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS
[1] [2] [3] [4]
ln(1-km employment density) 0.819a 0.676a 0.286a 0.312a
(0.284) (0.186) (0.087) (0.072)
ln(Urban centrality index) -0.069 0.073b
(0.046) (0.031)
First-stage F-statistic 8.46 14.74 49.21 52.77
Instrument ln(t-30 years employment density)
Informality & Inequality Y Y Y Y
Geography Y Y Y Y
Demography Y Y Y Y
Industrial composition Y Y Y Y
Observations 159 159 83 83
Notes: All regressions include state and year fixed-effects. Robust standard errors clustered by UA are in parenthe-
sis. a, b, and c indicates significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
6.3 Does city size matter?
Since our sample has a high degree of heterogeneity in city population size and, in particular,
since descriptive statistics in Sections 3 and 4 also show a clear relationship between city size and
income segregation and between city size and urban spatial structure, we now investigate the
effect of the 1-km density and the urban centrality index for different city sizes.
Table 8 shows TSLS results for different city size subsamples and urban spatial structures.
Column 1 considers only cities with less than 100,000 inhabitants. These smaller cities are all
monocentric. The estimated coefficients for the 1-km density and the urban centrality index are
insignificant.
In columns 2-4, we study UAs with population between 100,000 and 700,000 inhabitants. When
we jointly consider both urban forms (column 2), only the 1-km density is significant and positive
(0.591). According to their urban spatial structure, the effect of 1-km density increases to 0.745 in
monocentric cities (column 3), and reduces to 0.436 in polycentric UAs (column 4). Furthermore,
both urban forms also differ in their effect of the urban centrality index. For monocentric cities,
the estimated coefficient is negative and significant (-0.092), and show that an increase in their
urban centrality index (i.e., an employment location pattern more centralized around the CBD
than disperse) reduces income segregation. On the other hand, the estimated coefficient is positive
and significant (0.149) for polycentric cities and show that a reduction in the urban centrality index
(i.e., employment concentrated around subcenters and located far from the CBD) reduces income
segregation.
Finally, column 5 includes cities with more than 700,000 inhabitants. With the exception
of Cuiabá and Sorocaba, these cities are polycentric. Now the estimated coefficient for the
local density is negative and significant: a 10% increase in the 1-km density decreases income
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segregation by 0.9%. Furthermore, an increase in the degree of polycentricty (measured by a
lower urban centrality index), also helps to reduce income segregation.
Table 8: The effect of urban spatial structure on income segregation: Population size
Dependent variable: ln(HA index)
Population: <100,000 100,000-700,000 >700,000
Urban spatial structure: Mono Both Mono Poly Poly
Method: TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
ln(1-km employment density) 0.138 0.591a 0.745a 0.436a -0.092b
(0.274) (0.151) (0.174) (0.098) (0.033)
ln(Urban centrality index) 0.098 -0.036 -0.092c 0.149a 0.092a
(0.119) (0.033) (0.050) (0.037) (0.013)
First-stage F-statistic 8.20 17.00 13.47 4.51 94.38
Instrument ln(t-30 years employment density)
Informality & Inequality Y Y Y Y Y
Geography Y Y Y Y Y
Demography Y Y Y Y Y
Industrial composition Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 41 159 118 41 42
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by UA are in parenthesis. a, b, and c indicates significant at 1, 5, and 10
percent level, respectively.
To sum up, these results show that the effects of local density and of the urban centrality index
depend on the size of the city (inhabitants) and on the urban form. For the case of the 1-km
density: (1) there is no effect related to smaller (monocentric) cities, (2) it appears in medium size
cities by increasing income segregation and it is smaller in polycentric cities, (3) an increase of
local densities reduces income segregation in large (polycentric) cities. For the case of the urban
centrality index: (4) medium and large cities may reduce their income segregation by increasing
their degree of monocentricity (i.e., with jobs more clustered in and around the CBD) or by
increasing their degree of polycentricity (i.e., with jobs clustered in and around their subcenters
and located far from the CBD).
6.4 Do income groups matter?
We turn our attention to the different income groups. As shown in Section 3, the level of
segregation increases with income levels, so that in most cities the rich are far more segregated
than the poor. At the same time, while there was a reduction in the segregation of the rich
between 2000 and 2010, there was an increase in the segregation of the poor.
Table 9 shows TSLS results for the poor (Panel A) and the rich (Panel B). Column 1 considers
all cities in the sample and, in both cases, shows that, on average, only local density is significant:
a 10% increase in the 1-km density of jobs increases segregation of the poor and of the rich by a
4%.
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Table 9: The effect of urban spatial structure on income segregation: Poor vs. Rich
Dependent variable: ln(HA index)
Population: All <100,000 100,000-700,000 >700,000
Urban spatial structure: Both Mono Both Mono Poly Poly
Years: 00-10 00-10 00-10 00-10 00-10 00-10
Method: TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Panel A: Poor (10th percentile)
ln(1-km employment density) 0.425a 0.031 0.486b 0.769a 0.442b 0.196a
(0.117) (0.390) (0.201) (0.256) (0.183) (0.033)
ln(Urban centrality index) -0.029 0.140 -0.043 -0.091 0.115c -0.005
(0.029) (0.197) (0.038) (0.056) (0.065) (0.013)
Panel B: Rich (90th percentile)
ln(1-km employment density) 0.417a 0.371c 0.582a 0.729a 0.178 -0.010
(0.081) (0.222) (0.132) (0.161) (0.132) (0.022)
ln(Urban centrality index) -0.016 0.070 -0.025 -0.075 0.145a 0.076a
(0.019) (0.123) (0.031) (0.050) (0.045) (0.010)
First-stage F-statistic 64.40 8.20 17.00 13.47 4.51 94.38
Instrument ln(t-30 years employment density)
Informality & Inequality Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geography Y Y Y Y Y Y
Demography Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industrial composition Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 242 41 159 118 41 42
Notes: All regressions include state and year fixed-effects. Robust standard errors clustered by UA are in parenthe-
sis. a, b, and c indicates significant at 1, 5, and 10 percent level, respectively.
Column 2 reports results for the smaller (monocentric) cities. While the urban centrality index
remains not significant, job density significantly affects segregation of the rich, but not of the
poor.
Results for medium size cities (columns 3-5) show that, on average, a 10% increase in the 1-km
density increases segregation by a 5-6% (column 3). However, this effect is higher in monocentric
cities (column 4) than in polycentric UAs (column 5). When comparing the poor and the rich, the
density effect is similar between the two groups in monocentric cities, whereas it is higher and
only significant for the poor in polycentric cities. The urban centrality index is only significant for
polycentric UAs and it shows that an increase in the degree of polycentricity reduces segregation
of both income groups.
Finally, urban spatial structure seems to differently affect the segregation of the rich and of the
poor in the large (polycentric) cities: while local density conditions increase the segregation of
the poor, a more polycentric configuration reduces the segregation of the rich.
As a robustness check, Table E.2 in Appendix E reports results when considering a different
definition of the poor (20th percentile) and of the rich (80th percentile). While on average results
holds, there are a couple of differences that need to be commented: (1) the density effect is always
higher for the poor than for the rich in medium size and large cities; (2) an increase of density
reduces segregation of the rich and it does not affect segregation of the poor in large cities; (3)
medium size monocentric cities can reduce segregation of the poor by increasing their degree of
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monocentricity (with more jobs centralized in and around the CBD).
7. Conclusions
We have analyzed the relationship between income segregation, or the degree of unevenness in
the distribution of households by levels of income within cities, and urban spatial structure, or the
degree of spatial concentration of employment and its distribution in the urban space. Coming
back to our first question, ’Does employment density affect income segregation?’, we find that
higher local employment densities lead to higher levels of average income segregation. This effect
depends on city size and the level of monocentricity: the effect is not significant in small cities
with a unique center, strongest in medium sized cities with a high degree of monocentricity, and
opposite in larger cities that are more polycentric.
Regarding our second question, ’Does monocentricity-polycentricity foster income segrega-
tion?’, we find that the positive effect of local employment density on income segregation is
smaller in cities with a polycentric structure. What is more, in polycentric cities with employment
subcenters located far from the CBD, we find that local employment density actually decreases
income segregation. This result holds when we study the relationship for the segregation of the
rich, but it is actually opposite when considering the segregation of the poor.
These results can be interpreted in the light of urban theoretical models. Small cities are
characterized by relatively low levels of income segregation and high levels of employment
density and monocentricity, reflecting the fact that at small sizes commuting costs are relatively
low, making competition for location near the unique center less intense both for households and
firms.
As cities grow, the competition for proximity to an existing employment center intensifies,
raising land prices for both firms and households. How households of certain income levels
and firms react to this increased competition will depend on their valuation of local amenities
(which may be highly concentrated around the unique employment center), and how much firms
value proximity to these local amenities and to other firms. According to our results, the effect
of local employment density on income segregation has its peak in medium sized cities with a
monocentric structure, meaning that under these conditions, a higher local density of employment
leads to more homogeneous neighborhoods in terms of their income composition.
In larger cities, high rental prices and congestion costs in central locations ultimately lead to a
deconcentration of employment. This process is also accompanied by a relocation of households
of different income levels that adjust their residential location to their valuations of proximity to
old and new employment centers and local amenities. When cities reach a polycentric structure
with subcenters also present in areas outside the historical CBD -reflecting for instance the avail-
ability of public and transport infrastructure outside central areas -, increases in local employment
density lead to more heterogeneous neighborhoods in terms of income composition. According
to our results, this increased heterogeneity that accompanies the emergence of subcenters far
away from the CBD occurs because of a lower segregation of households at the top of the
income distribution. For those at the bottom of the income distribution, increased levels of local
24
employment density under a polycentric structure still lead to higher segregation levels, perhaps
reflecting the low residential mobility of those at the bottom of the income distribution and their
inability to bid for locations where households in higher income levels locate, and the presence
of alternative sources of informal employment.
From a policy point of view, our results suggest that income segregation is directly related to
the intrametropolitan location pattern of firms. Holding other factors constant (e.g., the benefits
of agglomeration economies), policies fostering more concentration of jobs in and around the
CBD and, in particular, in and around employment subcenters located far from the CBD (i.e., a
more polycentric spatial structure) might help to alleviate income segregation in Brazilian cities.
The question that arises is how to modify the urban spatial structure and, in particular, how to
promote polycentricity. While the literature on this topic is still scarce, recent research shows that
the emergence of local job density peaks that eventually become employment subcenters is related
to the intrametropolitan location of transportation infrastructure (Garcia-López et al., 2017a,b), a
key variable also related to income segregation (Glaeser et al., 2008).
References
Alonso, William. 1964. Location and Land Use. Toward a General Theory of Land Rent. Cambridge,
MA: Harvard University Press.
Ananat, Elizabeth O. 2011. The wrong side(s) of the tracks: The causal effects of racial segregation
on urban poverty and inequality. American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 3(2): 34–66.
Anas, Alex, Richard Arnott, and Kenneth A. Small. 1998. Urban spatial structure. Journal of
Economic Literature 36(3): 1426–1464.
Bischoff, Kendra and Sean F. Reardon. 2014. Residential segregation by income, 1970–2009. In
John Logan (ed.) Diversity and Disparities America Enters a New Century. Rusell Sage Foundation,
208–233.
Brueckner, Jan K and Stuart S Rosenthal. 2009. Gentrification and neighborhood housing cycles:
WillAmerica’s future downtowns be rich? The Review of Economics and Statistics 91(4): 725–743.
Brueckner, Jan K., Jacques-François Thisse, and Yves Zenou. 1999. Why is central Paris rich and
downtown Detroit poor? An amenity-based theory. European Economic Review 43(1): 91–107.
Brueckner, Jan K, Jacques-François Thisse, and Yves Zenou. 2002. Local labor markets, job
matching, and urban location. International Economic Review 43(1): 155–171.
Cavalcanti, Tiago and Daniel Da Mata. 2013. On the determinants of slum formation. Unpublished
manuscript, Department of Economics, University of Cambridge .
Cheshire, Paul, Vassilis Monastiriotis, and Stephen Sheppard. 2003. Income inequality and
residential segregation: labour market sorting and the demand for positional goods. In Paul
Cheshire and Vassilis Monastiriotis (eds.) Geographies of Labour Market Inequality. Routledge:
London, 83–109.
Chetty, Raj, Nathaniel Hendren, Patrick Kline, and Emmanuel Saez. 2014. Where is the land of
opportunity? The geography of intergenerational mobility in the United States. The Quarterly
Journal of Economics 129(4): 1553–1623.
25
Ciccone, Antonio and Robert E. Hall. 1996. Productivity and the density of economic activity. The
American Economic Review 86(1): 54–70.
Cutler, David M., Edward L. Glaeser, and Jacob L. Vigdor. 1999. The rise and decline of the
American ghetto. Journal of Political Economy 107(3): 455–506.
Da Mata, Daniel, Uwe Deichmann, J Vernon Henderson, Somik V Lall, and Hyoung Gun Wang.
2007. Determinants of city growth in Brazil. Journal of Urban Economics 62(2): 252–272.
Duranton, Gilles and Matthew A. Turner. 2012. Urban growth and transportation. The Review of
Economic Studies 79(4): 1407–1440.
Duranton, Gilles and Matthew A. Turner. 2016. Urban form and driving: Evidence from US cities.
Processed, Wharton School, University of Pennsylvania.
Feitosa, Flávia F., Quang Bao Le, Paul L.G. Vlek, Antônio Miguel V. Monteiro, and Roberta
Rosemback. 2012. Countering urban segregation in Brazilian cities: Policy-oriented explorations
using agent-based simulation. Environment and Planning B: Planning and Design 39(6): 1131–
1150.
Feler, Leo and J. Vernon Henderson. 2011. Exclusionary policies in urban development: Under-
servicing migrant households in Brazilian cities. Journal of Urban Economics 69(3): 253–272.
Fujita, Masahisa and Hideaki Ogawa. 1982. Multiple equilibria and structural transition of non-
monocentric urban configurations. Regional Science and Urban Economics 12(2): 161–196.
Galster, George, Royce Hanson, Michael R. Ratcliffe, Harold Wolman, Stephen Coleman, and
Jason Freihage. 2001. Wrestling sprawl to the ground: Defining and measuring an elusive
concept. Housing Policy Debate 12(4): 681–717.
Garcia-López, Miquel-Àngel. 2012. Urban spatial structure, suburbanization and transportation
in Barcelona. Journal of Urban Economics 72(2): 176–190.
Garcia-López, Miquel-Àngel, Camille Hemet, and Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal. 2017a. How does
transportation shape intrametropolitan growth? An answer from the Regional Express Rail.
Journal of Regional Science 57(5): 758–780.
Garcia-López, Miquel-Angel, Camille Hemet, and Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal. 2017b. Next train
to the polycentric city: The effect of railroads on subcenter formation. Regional Science and Urban
Economics 67(C): 50–63.
Garcia-López, Miquel-Àngel, Adelheid Holl, and Elisabet Viladecans-Marsal. 2015. Suburbaniza-
tion and highways in Spain when the Romans and the Bourbons still shape its cities. Journal of
Urban Economics 85: 52–67.
Glaeser, Edward L. 2008. Cities, agglomeration, and spatial equilibrium. Oxford University Press.
Glaeser, Edward L., Matthew E. Kahn, and Jordan Rappaport. 2008. Why do the poor live in
cities? The role of public transportation. Journal of Urban Economics 63(1): 1–24.
Griffin, Ernst and Larry Ford. 1980. A model of Latin American city structure. Geographical Review
: 397–422.
Henderson, J. Vernon, T. Regan, and Anthony Venables. 2016. Building the city: Sunk capital and
sequencing. Technical report, Discussion paper 11211, Centre for Economic Policy Research,
London.
26
Henley, Andrew, G. Reza. Arabsheibani, and Francisco G. Carneiro. 2009. On defining and
measuring the informal sector: Evidence from Brazil. World Development 37(5): 992–1003.
Hong, Seong-Yun, David O’Sullivan, and Yukio Sadahiro. 2014. Implementing spatial segregation
measures in R. PloS one 9(11): e113767.
Horton, Frank E. and David R. Reynolds. 1971. Effects of urban spatial structure on individual
behavior. Economic Geography 47(1): 36–48.
IPEA, IBGE, and UNICAMP. 2002. Caracterização e tendências da rede urbana do Brasil: Configuração
atual e tendências da rede urbana, volume 1. IPEA.
Jonasson, Erik. 2011. Informal employment and the role of regional governance. Review of
Development Economics 15(3): 429–441.
LeRoy, Stephen F. and Jon Sonstelie. 1983. Paradise lost and regained: Transportation innovation,
income, and residential location. Journal of Urban Economics 13(1): 67–89.
Lucas, Robert E. and Esteban Rossi-Hansberg. 2002. On the internal structure of cities. Economet-
rica 70(4): 1445–1476.
Massey, Douglas S. and Nancy A. Denton. 1988. The dimensions of residential segregation. Social
Forces 67(2): 281–315.
McDonald, John F. and Paul J. Prather. 1994. Suburban employment centres: The case of Chicago.
Urban Studies 31(2): 201–218.
McMillen, Daniel P. 2001. Nonparametric employment subcenter identification. Journal of Urban
Economics 50(3): 448–473.
Midelfart-Knarvik, Karen H., Henry G. Overman, Stephen Redding, and Anthony J. Venables.
2002. Integration and industrial specialisation in the European Union. Revue Économique 53(3):
469–481.
Mills, Edwin S. 1967. An aggregative model of resource allocation in a metropolitan area. The
American Economic Review 57(2): 197–210.
Monkkonen, Paavo and Xiaohu Zhang. 2014. Innovative measurement of spatial segregation:
Comparative evidence from Hong Kong and San Francisco. Regional Science and Urban Economics
47: 99–111.
Moreno-Monroy, Ana Isabel and Héctor M Posada. 2014. On the effect of transport subsidies on
informality rates. Technical report, CEPESP discussion paper, Fundação Getulio Vargas.
Muth, Richard F. 1969. Cities and Housing: The Spatial Pattern of Urban Residential Land Use. Chicago,
IL: University of Chicago Press.
OECD. 2018. Divided cities: Understanting intra-urban inequalities. Technical report, Organisa-
tion for Economic Co-operation and Development.
Pendall, Rolf and John I Carruthers. 2003. Does density exacerbate income segregation? Evidence
from US metropolitan areas, 1980 to 2000. Housing Policy Debate 14(4): 541–589.
Pereira, Rafael H.M., Vanessa Nadalin, Leonardo Monasterio, and Pedro H.M. Albuquerque. 2013.
Urban centrality: A simple index. Geographical analysis 45(1): 77–89.
27
Posada-Duque, Héctor M. 2015. Informality in the City: a Theoretical Analysis. Ph.D. thesis,
Universidad del Rosario.
R Core Team. 2015. R: A Language and Environment for Statistical Computing. R Foundation for
Statistical Computing, Vienna, Austria. url https://www.R-project.org/.
Reardon, Sean F. 2011. Measures of income segregation. Stanford Center for Education Policy
Analysis.
Reardon, Sean F and Kendra Bischoff. 2011. Income inequality and income segregation. American
Journal of Sociology 116(4): 1092–1153.
Reardon, Sean F and David O’Sullivan. 2004. Measures of spatial segregation. Sociological
Methodology 34(1): 121–162.
Ruiz-Rivera, Naxhelli and Paul van Lindert. 2016. Urban segregation in Latin America. Habitat
International (54): 1–2.
Stock, Jame H. and Motohiro Yogo. 2005. Testing for weak instruments in linear IV regression.
In Donald W.K. Andrews and James H. Stock (eds.) Identification and Inference for Econometric
Models: Essays in Honor of Thomas Rothenberg. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 80–108.
Telles, Edward E. 1995. Structural sources of socioeconomic segregation in Brazilian metropolitan
areas. American Journal of Sociology : 1199–1223.
Tiebout, Charles M. 1956. A pure theory of local expenditures. The Journal of Political Economy :
416–424.
Villaça, Flávio. 1998. Espaço intra-urbano no Brasil. Studio Nobel.
Watson, Tara. 2009. Inequality and the measurement of residential segregation by income in
American neighborhoods. Review of Income and Wealth 55(3): 820–844.
Wheeler, Christopher H. 2008. Urban decentralization and income inequality: Is sprawl associated
with rising income segregation across neighborhoods? Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Regional
Economic Development 4(1): 41–57.
28
Appendix A. Data sources and processing
Definition of urban agglomerations
Urban agglomerations (UAs) include metropolitan regions, non-metropolitan urban agglomera-
tions (resulting from conurbation), and subregional urban centers. Most urban agglomerations
extent beyond the boundaries of a single municipality8, and may include peri-urban areas and
small towns that fall under the influence of a proximate urban center. Besides the definition
of 68 metropolitan regions, there is no official consistent definition of city boundaries from the
Census. We use the grouping of municipalities by Da Mata et al. (2007), based on the definition
of functional urban areas of IPEA et al. (2002), to define 121 UAs in 2000 and 2010. These add
up to 171,393 enumeration areas in 2000 (out of which 158,307 are classified as urban) with
104’813,949 inhabitants and 176,056 areas in 2010 (out of which 158,307 are classified as urban)
with 109’343.196 inhabitants.
Geoprocessing of census data
The Brazilian Institute of Geography and Statistics (IBGE) freely distributes the Census micro-
data, which can be found at ftp://ftp.ibge.gov.br/Censos/. It also distributes the digital net-
works containing the boundaries of the enumeration areas for 2000 and 2010. The original digital
networks can be found at ftp://geoftp.ibge.gov.br/malhas_digitais/. We transformed them
to SIRGAS 2000 projected data (UTM South hemisphere zone 24 projection). The geoprocessing
was done in the R statistical environment (R Core Team, 2015) using the maptools, sp, rgdal, rgeos
and cleangeo packages. Figures A.1 and A.2 illustrate the geographical coverage and layout.
Figure A.1: Urban agglomerations, 2010
8For instance, the Metropolitan region of São Paulo extends over 39 different municipalities.
29
Figure A.2: Detail of urban agglomeration: Fortaleza, 2010
Geoprocessing of RAIS data
In order to geolocate firms, we find the best match of the postal address of each firm to a
corresponding address and in this way allocate each firm to an enumeration area, where possible.
We then sum the total number of employees in each enumeration area.
In more detail, we start by cleaning and fixing typos and errors, and creating standard
denominations for street types, abbreviations, and the like in the original RAIS database. We then
create a string for each firm containing the street name and number (i.e., we remove information
related to apartment/house/office/floor numbers and other specifics). To match the addresses in
the CNEFE database and these strings, we then use the amatch function from the package stringdist
in R (R Core Team, 2015) using an OSA matching algorithm for optimal string alignment distance,
with a tolerance of 30% difference with the total number of characters in each case.
After assigning one employee to firms with zero employees, we could geolocate 18’582,545
workers of a total of 22’163,453 employees in the original RAIS 2000 database located in mu-
nicipalities belonging to 121 UAs (i.e., 83,8% of the total), and 26,733,918 workers in 121 UAs,
out of 33’582,123 (79,4%) in 2009. The performance by UAs is between 75% and 90% in most
individual cases, with the exception of Brasília, for which we could geo-locate approximately
50% of employees of the RAIS. This is due to exceptionally low quality in address data in both
the RAIS and CNEFE databases.
Informality rate by UA
We use microdata from the census sample (amostra) to construct the informality rate by UA.
To calculate the rate, we aggregate the number of informal workers in each UA, and divide it
30
by the total number of workers (i.e., the sum of formal and informal workers). A worker is
classified as informal if he or she is an unregistered employee (empregado sem carteira assinada),
or a self-employed individual not contributing to social security, or an employer not contributing
to social security (Jonasson, 2011, Henley, Arabsheibani, and Carneiro, 2009). A formal worker,
by contrast, is a registered employee (empregado com carteira assinada), or self-employed individual
contributing to social security, or an employer contributing to social security. This definition
corresponds to the ’no signed labor card’ criteria of Henley et al. (2009).
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Appendix B. A-spatial versus spatial segregation indices
The spatial rank-order segregation indices H̃ rely on surface-based smooth density approxima-
tions that allow adjusting for the spatial extend of local neighborhoods, instead of relying on
ad hoc boundaries (Reardon and O’Sullivan, 2004, Hong, O’Sullivan, and Sadahiro, 2014). A
plausible population density surface can be obtained using interpolation techniques. Basically,
discrete enumeration-level data is converted to a population density surface (implicitly assuming
that the population of the census sector is uniformly distributed inside the sector), and the true
distribution is approximated with a Gaussian kernel density estimator. The value of the kernel
bandwidth can be varied to reflect more ample neighborhood definitions. The larger the neigh-
borhood definition, the lower the resulting segregation measure, because a larger geographical
reach implies more heterogeneity.
Although part of the literature suggests the use of spatial measures over a-spatial ones, spatial
measures reflect the assumptions made on interpolation, which may not best reflect the actual
connectivity between places. For instance, enumeration areas are often defined based on existing
natural and man-made barriers, such as major roads and rivers. For Brazilian cities, the average
enumeration area falls within a radius of 100 to 500 meters, so in principle, a-spatial measures
and spatial measures at this spatial range should be more or less equivalent. However, spatial
measures in a way ”blur” existing delimitations between areas that may correspond to actual
barriers, and in this way are likely to under-estimate the actual level of separation between two
places. On the other hand, it is possible that by taking into account that neighborhoods extend
beyond administrative boundaries, spatial measures correct for a possible upward bias in a-spatial
measures of segregation. To what extent these cases apply is unknown to the researcher. We use
a-spatial measures to keep out results comparable to the rest of the literature that largely relies on
a-spatial measures. The results using spatial measures for alternative neighborhood definitions
are available upon request. Both spatial and a-spatial measures were calculated using the R
package seg (Hong et al., 2014, R Core Team, 2015).
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Appendix C. Income profile estimation
To illustrate how we obtain the rank-order indices, Figure C.1 shows a fractional polynomial fitted
to the values of the a-spatial rank-order HA index by income percentiles for three selected cities.
Clearly, the level of segregation increases with income. In the three cases, the segregation of the
rich (HA(0.9)), that is, the value of the fitted line for p = 0.9, more than doubles the value of
segregation of the poor (HA(0.1)).
Figure C.1: Income profile for selected cities, 2010
The objective is to summarize the income profile into a single city-level measure of income
segregation. This is equivalent to finding the best fitting polynomial in a regression of the segre-
gation index for each income bin (e.g. HA(p)) against the cumulative proportion of population
in each income bin p in each city. Following Reardon (2011) and Reardon and Bischoff (2011),
we estimate the function H(p) in the following way. First, we calculate the pair-wise index Hk
for those above and below each k − 1 income threshold for each census sector. For each city, we
then run the following WLS regression of the k − 1 values of the segregation measures against pk,
the cumulative proportions of the population with incomes equal to or below k, and its M order
polynomial terms:
Hk = β0 + β1 pk + β2 p2k + ... + βM p
M
k + εk
with weights calculated as E(p) = −[plog2 p + (1 − p)log2(1 − p)]. The estimated city-level
values of H, are then calculated as Ĥ = ∆B̂, where B̂ is the vector of estimated coefficients
B̂ = (β0, β1, β2...βM) and ∆ is a vector of scalars for the corresponding polynomial case, as detailed
in Reardon (2011).9
9H can be then interpreted as a weighted mean of the pair-wise indices, where the weights are constructed so as to
give more importance to observations in the middle of the income distribution (since this range is more informative
about the segregation experienced by two randomly selected individuals) (Reardon, 2011).
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Appendix D. Summary statistics
Table D.1: Summary statistics for frequency of income bins
2000 2010
Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max
< 1/2 m.w. 0.011 0.011 0.001 0.063 0.035 0.031 0.004 0.148
1/2 − 1 m.w. 0.187 0.091 0.063 0.441 0.267 0.099 0.094 0.511
1 − 2 m.w. 0.209 0.041 0.124 0.276 0.314 0.045 0.201 0.417
2 − 3 m.w. 0.138 0.023 0.077 0.206 0.14 0.038 0.059 0.228
3 − 5 m.w. 0.172 0.04 0.079 0.258 0.118 0.031 0.051 0.19
5 − 10 m.w. 0.169 0.048 0.072 0.274 0.087 0.022 0.031 0.153
10 − 15 m.w. 0.045 0.013 0.017 0.078 0.016 0.006 0.003 0.045
15 − 20 m.w. 0.03 0.01 0.009 0.058 0.013 0.005 0.003 0.04
> 20 m.w. 0.038 0.016 0.007 0.1 0.01 0.005 0.002 0.043
Notes: 121 observations (cities) in ’All cities’ sample. m.w. = minimum wage(s). < 1/2 m.w. category does not
include heads of household with zero income.
Table D.2: Summary statistics for control variables
All cities Monocentric cities Polycentric cities
Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max Mean S.D. Min Max
Informality and Inequality
2000 Informality (%) 0.49 0.10 0.26 0.76 0.49 0.11 0.26 0.76 0.48 0.09 0.32 0.67
2010 Informality (%) 0.34 0.09 0.18 0.62 0.35 0.09 0.18 0.62 0.33 0.08 0.18 0.48
1990 Gini 0.55 0.04 0.43 0.65 0.56 0.05 0.43 0.65 0.55 0.04 0.48 0.63
2000 Gini 0.57 0.04 0.48 0.66 0.57 0.03 0.50 0.63 0.58 0.04 0.48 0.66
1990 Income cap. (2000 R$) 246 79 99 463 233 75 99 423 280 80 140 463
2000 Income cap. (2000 R$) 320 94 129 520 307 87 129 489 338 100 146 520
Geography (in 2000)
Total area (km2) 10,949 42,376 305 413,516 4,842 10,316 305 70,839 26,578 76,828 586 413,516
Dummy for coast 0.17 0.37 0 1 0.09 0.29 0 1 0.35 0.49 0 1
Dummy for semi-arid 0.10 0.30 0 1 0.10 0.31 0 1 0.09 0.29 0 1
Pop under land zone law (%) 0.77 0.34 0.00 1.00 0.73 0.38 0.00 1.00 0.89 0.10 0.64 1.00
Demography
1990 Pop > 55 yo (%) 0.10 0.02 0.05 0.15 0.11 0.02 0.05 0.15 0.09 0.02 0.06 0.13
2000 Pop > 55 yo (%) 0.12 0.02 0.06 0.17 0.13 0.02 0.07 0.17 0.11 0.02 0.06 0.15
1990 Pop < 25 yo (%) 0.68 0.05 0.56 0.85 0.67 0.05 0.56 0.85 0.70 0.06 0.56 0.82
2000 Pop < 25 yo (%) 0.48 0.04 0.42 0.61 0.47 0.04 0.42 0.57 0.49 0.04 0.43 0.61
1990 Migrants (%) 0.43 0.11 0.15 0.68 0.41 0.11 0.15 0.65 0.48 0.09 0.26 0.68
2000 Migrants (%) 0.43 0.10 0.16 0.64 0.42 0.10 0.23 0.62 0.45 0.09 0.16 0.64
Industrial composition
1990 Manufacturing (%) 0.27 0.08 0.14 0.54 0.27 0.09 0.14 0.54 0.27 0.08 0.15 0.50
2000 Manufacturing (%) 0.24 0.07 0.12 0.48 0.24 0.07 0.12 0.48 0.24 0.07 0.14 0.47
1990 Services (%) 0.59 0.08 0.37 0.74 0.57 0.07 0.37 0.73 0.63 0.07 0.43 0.74
2000 Services (%) 0.65 0.07 0.42 0.80 0.63 0.06 0.42 0.80 0.68 0.07 0.49 0.79
Notes: 121 observations (cities) in ’All cities’ sample. 87 and 72 monocentric cities, and 34 and 49 polycentric cities
in 2000 and 2010, respectively.
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Appendix E. Robustness checks
Results for 2010 HA computed with households information
Table E.1: The effect of urban spatial structure on income segregation: Alternative 2010 HA
Dependent variable: ln(HA index)
Percentile: 10th 20th 80th 90th
Method: TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5]
ln(1-km employment density) 0.568a 0.372a 0.521a 0.612a 0.537a
(0.145) (0.114) (0.140) (0.160) (0.148)
First-stage F-statistic 16.65 16.65 16.65 16.65 16.65
Instrument ln(t-30 years employment density)
Inequality & Inequality Y Y Y Y Y
Geography Y Y Y Y Y
Demography Y Y Y Y Y
Industrial composition Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 121 121 121 121 121
Notes: Robust standard errors clustered by UA are in parenthesis. a, b, and c indicates significant at 1, 5, and 10
percent level, respectively.
Results for alternative definitions of the poor and the rich
Table E.2: The effect of urban spatial structure on income segregation: Income 20% vs. 80%
Dependent variable: ln(HA index)
Population: All <100,000 100,000-700,000 >700,000
Urban spatial structure: Both Mono Both Mono Poly Poly
Years: 00-10 00-10 00-10 00-10 00-10 00-10
Method: TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS TSLS
[1] [2] [3] [4] [5] [6]
Panel A: Poor (20th percentile)
ln(1-km employment density) 0.529a -0.023 0.824b 1.224a 0.643a -0.010
(0.158) (0.413) (0.331) (0.378) (0.213) (0.111)
ln(Urban centrality index) -0.110b 0.174 -0.154b -0.283a 0.131c 0.123a
(0.052) (0.180) (0.072) (0.092) (0.073) (0.046)
Panel B: Rich (80th percentile)
ln(1-km employment density) 0.468a 0.371 0.646a 0.786a 0.338a -0.089a
(0.086) (0.259) (0.145) (0.166) (0.109) (0.025)
ln(Urban centrality index) -0.020 0.054 -0.030 -0.081 0.156a 0.097a
(0.022) (0.139) (0.035) (0.054) (0.040) (0.010)
First-stage F-statistic 64.40 8.20 17.00 13.47 4.51 94.38
Instrument ln(t-30 years employment density)
Inequality & Inequality Y Y Y Y Y Y
Geography Y Y Y Y Y Y
Demography Y Y Y Y Y Y
Industrial composition Y Y Y Y Y Y
Observations 242 41 159 118 41 42
Notes: All regressions include state and year fixed-effects. Robust standard errors clustered by UA are in parenthe-
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